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 The paper looks into the institutional features of regulating the 
2005 campaign for the election of the president of the Republic of 
Croatia. The role of the regulative institutions is analyzed within a 
broader context of the regulation of political funding in Croatia. The 
paper deals with the non-transparency of the system of party and 
election funding in Croatia based on a comparison of the principles of 
good practice in political funding. Nassmacher’s approach to the 
regulation of political finance is used as the analytical framework for 
the analysis of financing the 2005 presidential campaign in Croatia. It 
s based on four options: the autonomy option, the transparency op-
tion, the advocacy option, and the diversified regulation option. Ad 
finally, the paper offers a brief overview of the funds used by the 
presidential candidates in the 2005 election campaign. 
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 It seems the political party and election campaign funding in Croatia has 
become one of the central concerns in the senzibilization of the Croatian 
public for the issues related to the democratic political life. This was con-
firmed by the election for the president of the Republic in 2005. It was the 
first time that a considerable number of self-financing candidates partici-
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pated in the campaign, giving the campaign a distinctive – albeit perfunctory 
– character the Croatian public was not accustomed to. The principal 
novelty, however, in the financial aspect of the last elections was not the 
above feature, but the public disclosure of the funds the candidates for the 
head of state spent during the campaign. Due to the legal obligation1 to sub-
mit to the State Electoral Committee the report about the sources of the 
funds for the election campaigns, Croatia – at long last – is no longer among 
those countries in which the public disclosure of the data on political fi-
nancing (party and election funding) is not mandatory.2  
 Nevertheless, this legislative headway did not eliminate the crucial short-
coming of the general system of political financing in Croatia: the nonexis-
tence of a public agency for the verification of the validity of the information 
regarding the funds spent in the election campaigns. This resulted – immedi-
ately after the elections – in the accusations regarding the credibility of the 
election funds reports that the electoral camps of individual candidates sub-
mitted to the State electoral Committee.3 Since there were no institutions that 
could assess the validity of such accusations, the public was never fully in-
formed about the funds spent during the election campaigns. It also became 
clear that the State Electoral Committee was not equipped to verify these fi-
nancial reports. By obtaining the reports from the parties’ electoral head-
quarters, the Committee made these financial data public but not credible. 
 Once again it was demonstrated that the nonexistence of adequate regula-
tive institutions is the greatest weakness of the Croatian system of political 
finance. Namely, the practice of political finance in the world has shown that 
this role can be played solely by independent public agencies with a sound 
auditing potential. The fact that since 1990 the State Audit Office has not 
brought a single political party’s balance sheet under scrutiny is indicative of 
the enduring unwillingness of the Croatian political elite to establish a body 
with such powers. This did not deter it, however, to regularly control the fi-
nances of the NGOs. 
 
1 Law on Financing Election Campaign for the President of the Republic, Official Gazette 
no. 105, 2004.  
2 In a review paper on the global situation regarding financing parties and election cam-
paigns, one of the most eminent researchers of this subject, the British political scientist Mi-
chael Pinto-Duschinsky, listed Croatia among the countries in which there is no such obligation. 
With the exception (due to the specific circumstances) of Sweden and Finland, such practice, as 
a rule, has not been a feature of Western democracies. See Pinto-Duschinsky (2002: 76-77). 
3 The electoral camp of the President of the Republic Stjepan Mesić accused the HDZ's 
presidential candidate Jadranka Kosor of the preposterousness of the financial report of her 
camp about their election campaign funds. The claim that Ms Kosor in her election campaign 
spent about 6.500 EURO less than Mr Mesić was countered by the claim that the HDZ's elec-
toral camp spent for their candidate's campaign more than 4 million EURO. 
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 The shortcomings in the regulation of political funding in Croatia today 
are relatively well-known to social scientists. Unlike the period before 2000, 
when it was next to impossible to find in the Croatian journals any texts on 
political finance by political scientists or sociologists, or the Croatian trans-
lations of the relevant books about this topic, in the post-2000 period the 
situation dramatically changed and a number of works on that subject have 
been published, particularly in the fields of political science and law. It 
might be said with a considerable degree of certainty that the turning point 
was the 2001 initiative of the Croatian Legal Centre that the university pro-
fessors (political scientists, lawyers, philosophers) join forces in drafting the 
law on political parties. The major part of that working group’s effort, led by 
Professor Ivan Prpic, was related to the drafting of the legal provisions on fi-
nancing political parties. The drafted law on political parties, as well as a se-
ries of related papers and the initiatives were later published in the book 
form.4 In only a few years the literature on political party funding became 
ample, although there is still a paucity of the Croatian translations of the 
seminal works.5  
 While waiting for the major texts about political finance to be translated 
into Croatian, the initial works by Croatian researchers provide a good pic-
ture of the situation in that field. These works defined the standards of good 
practice in financing political parties and elections in the world and high-
lighted the significant deviations from this practice in Croatia. It should be 
noted that the expression good practice does not refer to a certain model of 
political financing but to a series of institutional arrangements of different 
models of financing parties and elections. The relevant authors advise cau-
tion when suggesting models of good practice to new democracies (Burnell, 
Ware, 1998). Generally, it is possible to identify only several basic rules that 
would enable Croatia to retain democratic control over public financing in a 
country.  
 Using as our starting point the assumption of the German political scien-
tist Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, it may be said that the successful reform of 
party and election funding requires the existence of a system of public fi-
nancing, the full disclosure policy, and the existence of an implementation 
agency with sanctioning powers (Nassmacher, 2003). In other words, for 
good practice in political finance it is essential to ensure at least partial party 
funding from the state budget, the full transparency and the sanctions in the 
case of the violation of the basic rules on financing politics.  
 
4 Ivan Prpic, ed., Država i političke stranke /The state and political parties/, Zagreb, 
Narodne novine, 2004. 
5 See Heidenheimer (1970), Pinto-Duschinsky (1981), Gunlicks (1993), Alexander, Shira-
tori (1994), Burnell, Ware (1998), Nassmacher (2001), Austin, Tjernström (2003).  
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 How does the political financing in Croatia compare with the dominant 
financing models, and how does the Croatian practice in political finance 
compare with the above principles of good practice? The system of political 
finance in Croatia undoubtedly belongs to the continental model of financing 
politics, which relies on the funding from party budgets. This system is char-
acteristic for all Central and Easteuropean transitional countries (Walecki, 
2003). The distinguishing feature of the Croatian system is perhaps in its 
heavier reliance on the state budget funding than is the case in most other 
countries, and as a rule makes up more than 80% of the regular party funds 
(Petak, 2003). This situation somewhat changes during the election cam-
paigns when the parties try to replenish their party budgets by a heftier share 
of private donations.  
 Much more problematic for Croatia is the second criterion – the full 
disclosure of party finances. The extent to which this standard is ignored in 
Croatia is obvious from the fact that it was only at the end of the 1990s that 
the political parties began submitting their financial reports to the Committee 
for the Constitution, Standing Orders and Political Parties of the Croatian 
Parliament, although they were obliged to do so ever since the Law on Po-
litical Parties had been passed in 1993. Moreover, even today some parties 
do not submit their financial reports, regardless of the fact that – as previ-
ously mentioned – the basic source of their party funds is the state budget.  
 This problem is illustrated in Table 1. Out of the sixteen parliamentary 
parties who had their representatives in the Croatian parliament during the 
studied period, only five of them (DC, HDZ, LS, SDP, SNS) regularly sub-
mitted their financial reports to the parliamentary Committee. Several politi-
cal parties submitted no (HKDU, HSLS, PGS) or only one report (IDS). The 
fact that they did not submit their financial reports regularly (or ever), did 
not cost any political party their regular state budgetary subsidies.  
 Another example of the partial disclosure of information concern the 
funds that the parties obtain from the sources apart from the state budget. 
Putting aside the funds they get from the membership fees and their own ac-
tivities, the rest of these revenues are itemized as “other revenues and con-
tributions”, whose sources are impossible to trace. In the parties’ 2003 re-
ports, the non-budgetary funds totalled 28.2 million kunas; the unaccounted 
funds (other revenues and contributions) amounted to 25.5 million kunas 
This means that 90.5% of the non-budgetary revenues or 25.4% of the total 
revenues of the political parties in Croatia de facto remained unaccounted 
for (Gong, 2005: 5-6).  
 Concerning the prevailing practice of financing election campaigns in 
Croatia, there are many shortcomings that deviate from good practice else-
where in the world, and even in the transitional countries. For example, be-
fore the 2005 presidential elections, there was no obligation in Croatia of 
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providing the full reports about the funding sources. The presidential candi-
dates in 2000 did not submit to the public the financial reports about the 
funds used in their campaign simply because there was no legal obligation to 
do so. Added to this is the fact that in the Croatian system of political fi-
nance there are no restrictions of the donations that can be given to a candi-
date or a political party, just as there is no regime of sanctions in case of the 
noncompliance with the rules on financing. Consequently, the system does 
not contain much good practice in the party and election funding. Croatia’s 
case is one of universal nontransparence of private funding, which became 
partly transparent only during the 2005 presidential elections. 
 
Table 1. Reports of political parties sent to the parliamentary committee 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
DC  + + + 
HB   – – 
HDZ + + + + 
HIP    – 
HKDU – – – – 
HNS – + + + 
HSLS – – – – 
HSP + – – + 
HSS + + – + 
IDS – – – + 
LIBRA   – + 
LS + + + + 
PGS – – – – 
SBHS + + + – 
SDP + + + + 
SNS + + + + 
Source: The analysis of the financial reports of the parliamentary parties for 2003, 
Zagreb, GONG, p.3 
Note: When a party submitted its financial report to the parliamentary Committee for 
the Constitution, Standing Orders and Political System for a particular year, this is 
marked with a (+); if not, it is marked with a (–). In the year when a party did not 
have any representatives in the Croatian Sabor, the box is empty.  
 
 The above features of the practice in funding the parties and elections in 
Croatia have not gone unnoticed by foreign researchers (Pinto-Duschinsky, 
2002; Ikstens et al., 2002; Toplak, 2003). The Croatian system of political 
finance is regarded as a typical example of “slim regulation”, meaning that 
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the entirety of political finance is regulated by only a few legal provisions. 
The regulation of the party funding still relies on a few general articles from 
the Law on Political Parties of 1993. The only concrete provision in that 
Law regarding this matter is Article 19 which regulates the manner of allot-
ting budgetary subsidies to the political parties. As previously noted, fi-
nancing the presidential election campaigns, on the other hand, is regulated 
by a separate Law adopted in 2004. This Law represented a slight shift to-
wards good practice in regulating political finance; in Article 3 it provides a 
detailed list of the sources from which the participants in the Croatian presi-
dential campaigns cannot accept donations in cash, other assets or services. 
Even more important is the provision from Article 6 which for the first time 
in the practice of the electoral funding in Croatia requires the public disclo-
sure of the collected funds. 
 Although this Law does not regulate, for example, the maximum dona-
tion from a single source, or the manner of financial reporting or the sanc-
tions for those who do not comply, the Law of 2004 was nevertheless a 
turning point in regulating political finance in Croatia. Namely, all the de-
scriptions of the condition of political financing in Croatia underline that 
Croatia is one of only a few European countries in which there is no obliga-
tion of the public disclosure of the sources of financing the electoral cam-
paigns (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002). This practice meant the total nontranspar-
ence of financing politics in Croatia, which many political studies about 
Croatia consider as one of the worst deficits in the development of the de-
mocratic processes in that country. This Law enabled Croatia to finally be 
excluded from the small group of European countries in which there is no 
obligation of the public disclosure of the sources of political finance, though 
it should be pointed out that the non-existence of the provisions regarding 
the public disclosure of the sources of funding does not necessarily and in-
variably lead to an undemocratic practice.6  
 A much bigger problem confronting Croatia is the control of political fi-
nance and sanctioning those who do not comply with the regulation regard-
ing the finance laws. There has been no shift in this regard practically from 
the first democratic elections held in 1990. This especially applies to the pri-
vate sources of financing which are often completely nontransparent and out 
of reach of any sanctioning. The extent to which the practice in this segment 
 
6 For example, in Sweden the transparency of political party funding has been achieved 
without the legal provisions on the public disclosure of political funding. In the debates about 
this issue in Sweden it was claimed that political parties are private associations of civil society 
and thus cannot be obliged to publicly disclose their budgets. Nevertheless, the parliamentary 
political parties reached an agreement on the public disclosure of their finances. Political scien-
tists think that this decision can be attributed to the high level of political culture in that country. 
See: Nassmacher (2003: 10). 
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of the political finance regulation is weak can be seen from the fact that the 
State Audit Office so far has not audited the finances of any political party 
although it regularly audits the finances of the non-governmental organiza-
tions. 
 That is why the list of the donations from private sources financing the 
election campaigns of the Croatian parties and presidential candidates often 
remains unfathomable. Besides, even when the data about the corporate do-
nations are listed, there is no institutional mechanism for verifying the legal-
ity of such transactions. It has turned out, for example, that the biggest flaw 
of the system of political financing in Croatia is the nonexistence of a public 
body (agency) with the capacity and the powers of sanctioning bad practice 
in political funding. Bad practice does not imply solely the private sources of 
financing. In the relevant literature on party and election funding, the case of 
the 2000 parliamentary elections in Croatia is cited as an almost textbook 
example, when the State Post Office did not charge the then ruling political 
party the huge postage fees for sending their campaign materials. .  
 In today’s political literature it is taken for granted that regulating politi-
cal finance is as important a criterion for constituting a democratic regime in 
a country as is the existence of an appropriate electoral system or the choice 
of basic political institutions that underpin governance, such as the choice 
between the parliamentary or the presidential system (Nassmacher, 2003:1). 
The political finance regulation is the problem that varies from one country 
to another and cannot be reduced to a sort of a package of universal rules. 
The only thing we can say for certain is that regulating the funds for parties 
and elections includes two essential elements: 1. the bans and restrictions; 2. 
the rules of the public disclosure and the manner of reporting about the spent 
funds. 
 The first part of the regulatory mechanisms – bans and restrictions – will 
result in limiting anonymous donations, particularly those by companies and 
by the corporate sector in general. The consequence of the second element of 
the regulation will be increased political finance transparency. These two 
regulatory mechanisms may result in different systems of regulation. Nass-
macher distinguished among four such systems or options, at least in the de-
veloped Western democracies: the autonomy option, the transparency op-
tion, the advocacy option, and the diversified regulation option (Nassmacher, 
2003: 10-13). 
 The first option considers parties as voluntary associations which have 
the right to freely dispose of their funds. The example of this type of regula-
tion is Sweden in which the political parties are not obliged to disclose the 
data about the funds they plan to use in their election campaigns. However, 
even in Sweden, whose system of party funding is as a rule free of corrup-
tive elements, it had turned out that fund-raising for the political parties had 
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a set of connotations that would not allow this issue to remain hidden from 
the public eye. The five Swedish parliamentary parties therefore agreed in 
1980 to swap the information on the obtained funds and also to allow every-
body else to get the information regarding their party finance. 
 The intention of the second option is to raise the level of transparency in 
financing political parties and elections. It focuses on citizens’ rights to gain 
insight into all aspects of party life, including party finance. This requires a 
very precise legislation regulating this matter. Nassmacher’s example of this 
option in the political finance regulation in Germany. Regarding this, he also 
points out that the inauguration of such a system may lead to overlooking 
two essential facts. The first is that voters may sanction the bad practice of 
some parties or candidates only if it is brought to their notice or they are re-
minded of it on the eve of elections, which is generally not the case. Second, 
citizens do not learn about party finances directly. The information about 
party funds are prepared and vetted by various actors – financial experts, 
journalists, social scientists – so that the relevant information reach citizens 
in a roundabout and often cryptic way. Since voters – as Anthony Downs 
(Downs, 1957) pointed out half a century ago – behave as rational ignora-
muses, the data on party finances should not be interesting to them per se 
unless they create some public outrage and then it is difficult to ignore them. 
 Due to the fact that transparency alone does not suffice, some countries 
resort to the institutional arrangement which Nassmacher calls the advocacy 
option. The example are the United States. To secure at least a semblance of 
regularity in political funding it is necessary to set up a public agency which 
will, on behalf of the public, monitor and control the funds intended for par-
ties and elections. Thus in the 1970s the US established the Federal Election 
Commission, tasked with the scrutiny of all the flows of political funding. 
However, as has been often pointed out by the experts for this type of regu-
lating political finance, such agencies are just one of the actors in the policy 
process related to the regulation. This system is supposed to galvanize public 
action, which is not possible without different sorts of incentives, and such 
an agency is not enough to provide them. 
 Hence the fourth type of the regulation which Nassmacher calls the 
diversified regulation option, the example for which is Canada. This regula-
tion does not rely on only one kind of measures, but combines the diversified 
system of measures. By trying to avoid the traps of the systems of total 
openness (the autonomy option), or of the detailed systems (the transparency 
option) or the systems in which the existence of a public agency does not re-
solve the problem of the structure of political finance (the advocacy option), 
this last approach introduces a multidimensional system that combines the 
transparency of political funding with a plethora of the measures in the 
structure of financing. For example, the Canadian Election Law envisages 
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the ceiling in electoral campaign spending, the financing structure has been 
expanded by providing subsidies to small donors, parties and candidates, the 
public must be informed about all the donations exceeding 100 Canadian 
dollars, and an independent agency for monitoring the activities connected 
with political finance has been established.  
 The lack of a public agency with the capacity and the power of auditing 
the funds spent in election campaigns is the most serious drawback of the 
entire Croatian system of political finance. The transparency option, intro-
duced in the form of the obligation of the presidential candidates to account 
for the financial sources of their electoral promotion, has turned out to be an 
insufficient model of regulation. Croatia lacks certain forms of the advocacy 
option, and simply there is no institution that could verify the data presented 
to the public. 
 















Stjepan Mesić 1,000,000 1,996,883 2,911,604 580,000 6,488,487 
Jadranka Kosor – – – 6,438,926 6,438,926 
Boris Mikšić 6,000,000 – – – 6,000,000 
Đurđa Adlešić – 200,000 – 1,263,540 1,463,540 
Ivić Pašalić 112,500 1,091,300 – 30,000 1,233,800 
Ljubo Ćesić 758,754 – – – 758,754 
Miroslav Blažević 738,000 – – – 738,000 
Slaven Letica – – 420,503 64,757 485,260 
Doris Košta 150,000 1,000 – – 151,000 
Ante Kovačević 90,700 7,800 36,600 – 135,100 
Mladen Kešer 44,445 37,000 20,000 – 101,445 
Tomislav Petrak – – – 37,257 37,257 
Miroslav Rajh 1,000 2,500 – 4,000 7,500 
Source: Official Gazette, 2005. 
 
 Namely, what have the data published by the State Electoral Committee 
shown? As can be seen from Table 2, the data provide the structure of the 
presidential candidates’ funds that has been divided into four key categories: 
personal funds, donations by physical persons, corporate donations and the 
donations by various associations, and political party donations. The two 
candidates with the smallest budgets aside, personal funds were the only or 
the major source of financing for more than half of the candidates (Mikšić, 
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Ćesić, Blažević, Košta, Kovačević, Kešer); however, only one of them 
achieved notable results in the elections (Boris Mikšić). The parties, on the 
other hand, were the chief source of funding for only two candidates (Kosor, 
Adlešić), and to a smaller degree for two more candidates (Mesić, Letica). 
For the campaign camp of the last two candidates as well as for another can-
didate (Pašalić), the most important source were their sympathizers’ dona-
tions and contributions, both from individuals and corporations.  
 Without the appropriate public agency which could verify the data from 
the financial reports of the presidential candidates, this role was taken up by 
an NGO – Transparency International Croatia. It was only after the dogged 
insistence of this NGO that the HRT published the data on the campaign 
spending on the Croatian TV and the Croatian radio. It turned out that the 
biggest spender was Jadranka Kosor (2.9 million kunas), and that Stjepan 
Mesić spent a much smaller amount (1.45 million kunas), the fact that 
brought into question the credibility of the information that Mesić spent 
more money on his election campaign than Kosor. 
 The financial aspect of the 2005 presidential elections campaign con-
tained some new elements, until then nonexistent in the system of political 
financing in Croatia. This especially refers to the obligation of the public 
disclosure of the budgets used for financing the campaigns, and the cutting 
down on the possible sources of funding. It is especially important that the 
public disclosure of the financial reports for the first time brought under 
public scrutiny the money entering politics from the private sector, until then 
more or less hidden from the public. This also allayed the misgivings about 
political corruption, regularly accompanying the political funds coming from 
anonymous donations from the private sector (Williams, 2000). The key 
shortcoming of the system of political finance is, again, the nonexistence of 
the agency that might verify the financial reports that the candidates and the 
political parties send to the State Electoral Committee. The establishment of 
such an agency, which would be underpinned by considerable auditing pow-




Politička misao, Vol. XLII, (2005.), No. 5, pp. 75–85 85 
                                                                                                                            
References 
Alexander, Herbert E., Shiratori, Rei (ed.), 1994: Comparative Political Finance 
Among the Democracies, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado 
Austin, Reginald, Tjernström, Maja (ed.), 2003: Funding of Political Parties and 
Election Campaigns, IDEA, Stockholm  
Burnell, Peter, Ware, Alan (ed.), 1998: Funding Democratization, Manchester Uni-
versity Pres, Manchester 
GONG, 2005: Analiza financijskih izvješća parlamentarnih stranaka za 2003., 
GONG, Zagreb 
Gunlicks, Arthur B. (ed.), 1993: Campaign and Party Finance in North America and 
Western Europe, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado 
Heidenheimer, Arnold J. (ed.), 1970: Comparative Political Finance, D. C. Heath, 
Lexington, MA 
Ikstens, Jãnis et al., 2002: Political Finance in Central Eastern Europe. Ősterreichi-
sche Zeitschrift für Politikwisenschaft, 31 (1): 21-39 
Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz (ed.), 2001: Foundation for Democracy: Approaches to 
Comparative Political Finance, Nomos, Baden-Baden 
Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz, 2003: Introduction: Political Parties, Funding and Democ-
racy, in: Austin, R., Tjernström, M. (ed.), Funding of Political Parties and Elec-
tions Campaigns, IDEA, Stockholm: 1-19 
Petak, Zdravko, 2003: Financing Political Parties in Croatia: Parliamentary Elections 
2003, Politička misao, 38 (5): 68-74. 
Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael, 1980: British Political Finance 1830-1980, American 
Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC  
Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael, 2002.: Financing Politics: A Global View, Journal of 
Democracy, 13 (4): 69-86 
Prpić, Ivan (ed.), 2004: Država i političke stranke, Narodne novine, Zagreb  
Toplak, Jurij, 2003: Party Funding and Corruption in Balkan Countries: The Example 
of Slovenia and Croatia, in: Political Party and Election Campaign Financing in 
Southeastern Europe, Transparency International – Bugarska, Sofija: 44-55 
Walecki, Marcin, 2003: Money and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, in: Aus-
tin, R., Tjernström, M. (ed.), Funding of Political Parties and Elections Cam-
paigns, IDEA, Stockholm: 71-94 
Williams, Robert (ed.), 2000: Party Finance and Political Corruption, Macmillan/St. 
Martin’s Press, London/New York 
